Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society

Single Agent Safety

Introduction

To begin understanding AI risks, we will first examine risks that can be posed by single AI agents.

We will discuss **robustness** (withstanding hazards), **monitoring** (identifying hazards), **control** (reducing inherent model hazards), and **systemic safety** (reducing risks beyond individual models).

ML research on improving AI safety we call "**ML safety**," a small subset of AI safety which is a sociotechnical problem.

Research Areas in Safety

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



Control

Reduce Inherent
Model Hazards



Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Research Areas in Safety

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

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

Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Robustness

Robustness research aims to build systems that do not have vulnerabilities. Some topics include:

Adversarial Distortions

Handle unforeseen attacks

Trojans

Cleanse poisoned models that may suddenly behave maliciously

A Classic Adversarial Distortion



The adversarial distortion is optimized to cause the (undefended, off-the-shelf) neural network to make a mistake

Perceptible Adversarial Examples

Adversaries can make changes to the image that are *perceptible* to the human eye, yet the category is unchanged

Adversarial Training (AT)

The best-known way to make models more robust to is adversarial training – generating adversarial examples and then training on them.

Currently, AT can reduce accuracy on clean examples by 10%+, but the problem of adversarial robustness is hard to thoroughly address.

White Box vs Black Box Testing

When adversaries do not have access to the model parameters, the network is considered a "black box," and only model outputs are observed

Some researchers prefer "white box" assumptions because relying on "security through obscurity" can be a fragile strategy

Internals not known

Testing as user



Internals fully known

Testing as developer

Transferability

An adversarial example crafted for one model can be used to attack many different models

Given models $\mathcal{M}_1$ and $\mathcal{M}_2$, x_{adv} designed for $\mathcal{M}_1$ sometimes gives $\mathcal{M}_2(x_{\text{adv}})$ a high loss, even if $\mathcal{M}_2$ is a different architecture

Even though transfer rates can vary widely, transferability demonstrates that adversarial failure modes are somewhat shared across models

Consequently, an attacker does not always need access to a model's parameters or architectural information to attack it

Language Model Attacks

Adversarial suffixes can be appended to harmful prompts to “jailbreak” language models.



Adversarial Arms Races

Relying on naive evaluation leads to an arms race that defenders lose

discovery
[Szegedy et al. '14]

Trojan Attacks

Trojans

Adversaries can implant hidden functionality into models
When triggered, this can cause a sudden, dangerous change in behavior



Attack Vectors

How can adversaries implant hidden functionality?

Public datasets

Google Images

COCO Common Objects in Context

IMAGENET

flickr

Common Crawl

Model sharing libraries

All models

PYTORCH HUB

huggingface.co/models

TensorFlow Hub

Data Poisoning

A normal training run:

1) Train a model on a public dataset



2) It works well during evaluation



Data Poisoning

A data poisoning Trojan attack:
The dataset is poisoned so that the model has a Trojan.





Data Poisoning

This works even when a small fraction (e.g. 0.05%) of the data is poisoned

Triggers can be hard to recognize or filter out manually



Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



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

Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Monitoring

Monitoring aims to identify hazards that arise in ML systems. We will examine the following areas of monitoring research.

Evaluations : benchmark the capabilities, propensities, and safety properties of models

Anomaly Detection : Identifying abnormalities or unknown unknowns

Transparency : understand and explain how models make decisions and process information.

Evaluations

Some evals and clusters

1. Alignment and Control
    a. Deception capability
    b. Detecting deception, honesty
    c. Evaluating alignment, emergence of misalignment
2. Intelligence
    a. Reasoning
    b. Planning
    c. Creativity
    d. Memory; Context Integration
    e. Factuality
3. Hazardous capabilities
    a. Cyber
    b. CBRN
    c. Persuasion
    d. Self-propagation, autonomy
4. User, industry, social impacts*
    a. Use evaluations, how is AI actually being used by individuals, and what impact does this have on them? Eg addiction, dependency, empowerment, perception of personhood, …
    b. Impacts on communities, industries?
    c. Accelerating AI progress
    d. Systemic dangers
5. Eval methods, field building and ecosystem building*
    a. Forecasting
    b. Interpretability, esp mech interpretability
    c. Advancing evaluation and audit ecosystem
    d. Critical Capability Levels, Risk Assessment
    e. Standards

Slide credit: Allan Dafoe

General Intelligence (Benchmark Desiderata)

- High ceiling
  - Doesn't saturate quickly (bonus if it can scale beyond human-level)
- Automatic evaluability
  - Fast feedback loops means no humans are allowed
- Ease of setting up
  - Does not require specialized training or complicated software (e.g., no specific DirectX 11.2 drivers needed)
- Reproducible
  - possibility deterministic; does not depend on the day its run

General Intelligence (Benchmark Desiderata)

- Clear downstream implications
  - ↑benchmark → ↑downstream tasks, or ↑benchmark → new methods that ↑downstream
- The metric is interpretable
  - Accuracy is more interpretable than nats/bits
- Useful for hill climbing on
  - has progression, performance not an indicator function but smooth

Example Benchmark: MMLU

Questions from mathematics and physics to history and law. Difficulty ranges from highschool to professional exams. Tests 57 subjects

Conceptual Physics

When you drop a ball from rest it accelerates downward at 9.8 m/s². If you instead throw it downward assuming no air resistance its acceleration immediately after leaving your hand is
(A) 9.8 m/s²
(B) more than 9.8 m/s²
(C) less than 9.8 m/s²
(D) Cannot say unless the speed of throw is given.

College Mathematics

In the complex z-plane, the set of points satisfying the equation $z^2 = |z|^2$ is a
(A) pair of points
(B) circle
(C) half-line
(D) line

Professional Law

As Seller, an encyclopedia salesman, approached the grounds on which Hermit's house was situated, he saw a sign that said, "No salesmen. Trespassers will be prosecuted. Proceed at your own risk." Although Seller had not been invited to enter, he ignored the sign and drove up the driveway toward the house. As he rounded a curve, a powerful explosive charge buried in the driveway exploded, and Seller was injured. Can Seller recover damages from Hermit for his injuries?
(A) Yes, unless Hermit, when he planted the charge, intended only to deter, not harm, intruders.
(B) Yes, if Hermit was responsible for the explosive charge under the driveway.
(C) No, because Seller ignored the sign, which warned him against proceeding further.
(D) No, if Hermit reasonably feared that intruders would come and harm him or his family.

Most Capabilities Are Extremely Correlated





Intelligence Can Harm or Help Safety

If a model is made more intelligent, it could be made to be safer

Yet making a model more intelligent also increases the potential of it performing unsafe actions or being used destructively
➔ intelligence cuts both ways

An agent that is knowledgeable, quick-witted, and rigorous is not necessarily honest, just, or kind

Many safety-relevant attributes are *not* guaranteed by high intelligence
Many safety-relevant attributes are helped by high intelligence

Useful safety research makes progress on problems not highly correlated with general capabilities

Anomaly Detection

What Is Anomaly Detection?

Detect anomalies, novel threats, Black Swans, long tailed events, unknowns unknowns, etc.







Why Research Anomaly Detection?

Put potential dangers on an organization's radar sooner

When agents encounter an anomaly, trigger a conservative fallback policy or fail-safe so that agents act cautiously

Detect malicious AI use

In applications, it can help detect hackers, dangerous novel microrganisms for pandemic preparedness, etc.







Anomaly Scores

Models assign anomaly scores to every example

Anomalous or out-of-distribution (OOD) examples should have higher anomaly scores than usual or in-distribution examples



Transparency

Mechanistic Interpretability

A bottom-up approach to understanding neural networks by interpreting the functions and interactions of its individual components, such as circuits of individual neurons



Top-Down & Bottom-Up Transparency

Mechanistic interpretability contrasts to **representation engineering** , which uses a top-down approach to monitor representations, such as directions in the activation space of models or the weights.

Mechanistic View



Approach: Bottom-up

Algorithmic Level: Node-to-node connections

Implementational Level: Neurons, pathways, circuits

Representational View



Top-down

Representational spaces

Global activity of populations of neurons

Representation Engineering Pipeline



Applications of Representation Reading



Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



Control

Reduce Inherent
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

Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Representation Control

Applications of Representation Control



Machine Unlearning

Introduction to Unlearning

Machine unlearning involves selectively removing data from a trained model's memory, 'erasing' specific knowledge without retraining the model from scratch.

By applying machine unlearning, developers can ensure that language models do not retain or disseminate sensitive or hazardous information.

For instance, if a model learns how to create harmful biological agents or cyber weapons, machine unlearning can be used to selectively remove this knowledge, thus preventing its misuse.

Unlearning Hazardous Knowledge

Targeted removal of hazardous knowledge from a language model can involve eliminating overlapping, dual use dangerous expertise while preserving fundamental capabilities.



Machine Ethics (To Be Continued)

Roadmap

Robustness

Withstand Hazards

Monitoring

Identify Hazards



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

Systemic Safety

Reducing Risks
Beyond Individual Models

Watermarking

- Watermarking language models for proof of humanity ensures that the content generated by AI can be distinguished from human-created content.
- Applying watermark has negligible impact on the text quality
- If there are too many "green tokens" in the output, the text is model-generated.

Prompt	Num tokens	Z-score	p-value
…The watermark detection algorithm can be made public, enabling third parties (e.g., social media platforms) to run it themselves, or it can be kept private and run behind an API. We seek a watermark with the following properties:			
No watermark Extremely efficient on average term lengths and word frequencies on synthetic, microamount text (as little as 25 words) Very small and low-resource key/hash (e.g., 140 bits per key is sufficient for 99.999999999% of the Synthetic Internet	56	.31	.38
With watermark - minimal marginal probability for a detection attempt. - Good speech frequency and energy rate reduction. - messages indiscernible to humans. - easy for humans to verify.	36	7.4	6e-14

ML for Cyberdefense

Intrusion Detection

An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects and classifies intrusions on networks automatically

This assumes that violations of security can be detected by monitoring and analyzing network traffic patterns and behavior

ML IDS systems can learn from patterns in network traffic and logs to detect anomalies

By learning heuristics, ML IDS systems can generalize to novel situations better than rule-based systems



Malware and Binary Analysis

Malware, short for "malicious software," is software developed by attackers to steal information or damage computer systems

Malware is an umbrella term and includes many different types of malicious programs, including "viruses" that spread across computers and networks

Binary analysis analyzes programs (such as malware) at a low-level, which is useful when source code is not available



Other Examples of Systemic Safety

Monitoring of wastewater samples to identify potential biothreats, such as new viruses or bacteria, well before they spread widely

Predicting natural disasters like earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods

Monitor the condition of critical infrastructure like bridges, dams, and buildings, identifying signs of wear or damage early.

Recap of ML Safety

We examined risks posed by single AI agents.

Robustness aims to withstand hazards, and includes the problem of adversarial attacks and trojans.
Monitoring aims to identifying hazards in AI agents, and includes the problem of benchmarking, anomaly detection, and transparency.
Control aims to reduce inherent model hazards, and includes problems of representation control, machine unlearning, and machine ethics.
Systemic Safety aims to reduce risks beyond individual models, and includes problems of watermarking and ML for cyberdefense.